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CURRENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
EDWARD GORDON*

Trends
International Law in American Courts:
Some Highlights of 1980
If you use LEXIS, as I do, to search out unusual similarities among the
hundreds of decisions which find their way into the federal reporters each
year, you may have noticed that the words "international law" appear in

some sixty-four judicial opinions issued during 1980, excluding those opinions which pertain to attachment orders in the Iranian assets cases. That is
a decent number for a field which some of my colleagues in academe regard

as impractical. As it is, it considerably understates the number of cases
argued before American courts last year in which issues of international law
had to be researched by counsel, judges and law clerks, since in many
instances such issues, though raised and considered, are not discussed in
judicial opinions because the courts decide the cases on other, usually narrower, often less intellectually imposing, grounds.'
The range of international legal issues involved in American judicial
decisions during 1980 is also impressive. The limits of national competence

figured directly or indirectly in most of them, frequently implicating questions of foreign state immunity, 2 the act of state doctrine (which continues

*Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Union University.
'See discussion in Gordon, American Courts, InternationalLaw and "'Political Questions"
Which "Touch Foreign Relations," 14 INT'L LAW. 297 (1980).
2
Eg., Broadbent v. OAS, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Sugarman v. Aeromexico, 626 F.2d
270 (3d Cir. 1980); Decor by Nikkei International, Inc. v. Republic of Nigeria, Civ. No. 772348 (S.D.N.Y. slip op., Aug. 19, 1980); Rex v. Cia. Peruana de Vapores, Civ. No. 78-3649
(E.D. Pa., slip op., June 24, 1980); Jones v. Shipping Corp. of India, Ltd., 491 F. Supp. 1260
(E.D. Va. 1980); Ruggiero v. Cia. Peruana de Vapores, Civ. No. 78-2585 (E.D.N.Y., slip op.,
June 10, 1980); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980); Letelier
v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980); and Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980).
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to make more sense as a derivation of foreign state sovereignty than as a
contorted offshoot of American constitutional law), 3 the maritime limits of
national jurisdiction, 4 and the enforcement of foreign judgments and
awards.5 The right to assert international law was frequently at issue, 6 even
in tax cases, where the courts' uneasiness with international law as a concept is particularly evident. 7 Perhaps most of all, the international legal
dimensions of issues being litigated manifested themselves in cases in which
the principal issue was whether some exercise of the treaty power 8 or international extradition 9 conformed to constitutional requirements.
Certain of these cases have been discussed in previous installments of
Trends, but several of the most important have not. One reason is that,
though important in themselves, they do not readily form or fit into a pattern of decisions; such patterns, after all, are what Trends is about. But they
clearly should not be overlooked, either. Therefore, this installment of
Trends is devoted to some case decisions handed down in 1980 which form
or are part of patterns which have yet to declare themselves-to me, at any
rate.

3

Eg., Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Civ. No. 77-1251 (S.D.N.Y., slip op.,
Nov. 26, 1980); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, note 2 supra; Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, note 2 supra; and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical
Bank New York Trust Co., Civ. No. 61-0485 (S.D.N.Y., slip op., Jan. 4, 1980).
'United States v. California, - U.S. - (1980); United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Williams, 617
F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Monroy, 614 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1980); and United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980). See also People v. Weeren, 28
Cal. 3d 654 (1980). The leading case on point, in terms of its conceptual ambit, is FTC v.
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, No. 78-2160 (D.C. Cir., slip op., Nov. 17,
1980), which is described at length in text, infra.
'E.g., Hunt v. BP Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
(discussed in text, infra); Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.
Tex. 1980); and Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, note 2
supra.

6
See, e.g., Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Goldschmidt, 627 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir.
1980); United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980); Hunt v. BP Exploration Company
(Libya) Ltd., note 5 supra; and American International Group. Inc. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, No. 79-3298 (D.D.C., slip op., July 10, 1980). As to the last named of these cases, see
Gordon, The Blocking of Iranian Assets, 14 INT'L LAW. 659 (1980).
'See, e.g., Quilty v. Commissioner, No. 79-7846, T.C. Memo. 1980-420, 40 C.C.H. 1352
(Sept. 22, 1980); and Campbell v. Commissioner, No. 8100-79, T.C. Memo. 1980-345, 40
C.C.H. 1080 (Aug. 28, 1980). Cf. Lull v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
'E.g., Rossi v. Brown, No. 79-1485 (D.C. Cir., slip op., Sept. 15, 1980); Greater Tampa
Chamber of Commerce v. Goldschmidt, note 6 supra; Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375 (9th
Cir. 1980); and Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980).
9In re Jan Alf Assarsson, No. 79-1689 (7th Cir., slip op., Oct. 31, 1980); Caltagirone v.
Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980); Petition of Geisser, 627 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Valot, 625 F.2d'308 (9th Cir. 1980); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th
Cir. 1980); and Hu Yau-Leung v. Suscia, No. CV-80-2203 (E.D.N.Y., slip op., Nov. 17, 1980).
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On the surface, the question before the federal Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia was a relatively straightforward one of statutory interpretation: Did Congress expressly or implicitly authorize the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to serve its investigatory subpoenas directly upon citizens of foreign countries, residing abroad, by means of registered mail?
Judge Malcolm Wilkey, writing for himself and Judge Gerhard A. Gesell
(Judge Carl McGowan concurred in the result) said, however, that the
court's answer to the question "is primarily guided by our recognition of
established and fundamental principles of international law."
The court began by noting that federal courts have long acknowledged
that the investigatory and regulatory reach of domestic agencies may, and
often must, extend across national boundaries. The D.C. Circuit itself had
previously recognized that those agencies may under certain circumstances
compel the production of documents located abroad. But it did not invariably follow from that history that Congress therefore intended to authorize
regulatory agencies in general, and the FTC in particular, to employ any
and all methods to serve compulsory process when conducting investigations.
When an American regulatory agency directly serves its compulsory process upon
a citizen of a foreign country, the act of service itself constitutes an exercise of
American sovereign power within the area of the foreign country's territorial sovereignty. Though some techniques of service may prove less obnoxious than
others to foreign sensibilities, our recognition of those sensibilities must affect our
willingness to infer congressional authorization for a particular mode of service
from an otherwise silent statute. In the face of the foreign country's direct protest
to the mode of service employed here, and in the absence of a clear congressional
intent at the time this subpoena was served to authorize that manner of exercise
of American sovereign power, we decline to infer the necessary statutory authority for the FTC's chosen mode of subpoena service.I
The case grew out of a nonpublic antitrust investigation of the United
States fiberglass insulation industry which the FTC has been conducting
since 1977. One of the principal targets of the investigation is defendant
Saint-Gobain, a French holding company which is headquartered in Paris
but has a general delegate based in New York City. In September 1977 the
FTC issued four identical subpoenas duces tecum directing the defendant
company to produce specified classes of documents relevant to the investigation. One copy of the subpoena was served by registered mailing to the
defendant's corporate headquarters in Paris; the second was hand-delivered
to the New York office of defendant's general delegate in the United States;
the third was delivered to the New York City residence of the daughter of
the defendant's general delegate; the fourth was served upon the Washington, D.C., attorney who was representing defendant in a related proceeding.
-636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

"636 F.2d at 1304.
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When defendant refused to comply with the subpoenas, the FTC petitioned the district court for an enforcement order pursuant to section 9 of
the FTC Act.12 In response to the court's show cause order, defendant
asserted that it should be excused from compliance because none of the
modes of service was authorized by the Act. Finding the subpoenas relevant to the FTC's inquiry, however, and the mode of service to be proper,
the district court issued the requested order enforcing the subpoena.
On appeal, the circuit court, addressing only the issue of whether the
subpoenas had been properly served, concluded that the latter three methods were improper. It remanded the record to the district court, directing it
to examine the validity of the first method-that is, registered mailing to the
Paris headquarters of defendant, and in particular to construe the relevant
authorizing statutes to determine the underlying congressional intent. It
cautioned the district court to pay special attention to whether its construction of those statutes conformed to accepted principles of international law,
"since Congress is customarily presumed, unless a plain intention appears
to the contrary,3 to avoid conflict with such principles as well as with the
Constitution."'
Following argument on remand, the French Embassy sent a note to the
State Department, protesting that the FTC's direct transmittal of a subpoena to defendant's Paris headquarters via registered mail "is inconsistent
with the general principles of international law and constitutes a failure to
recognize French sovereignty." "Moreover," the note continued, "the
French Government has expressed formal reservations regarding the application in France of the principle of pre-trial discovery of documents characteristic of common law countries." It added that defendant's response to
certain of the FTC's discovery requests would subject defendant's directors
to civil and criminal liability and therefore expose them to judicial proceedings in France. But the district court concluded that neither the Constitution nor the statute intended to deny the FTC the right to send a subpoena
by mail to a foreign corporation suspected of unfair trade practices in violation of the FTC Act.14 It thus issued a second order reiterating its original
enforcement of the subpoena. In the opinion here reported the court of
appeals vacated both orders.
A. Questions before the Court

It determined that the case presented two questions for resolution:
1. Was the challenged mode of service authorized by the language of the
FTC Act or does the legislative history of the Act and similarly
worded statutes reveal any congressional intent to authorize it?
215 U.S.C. § 49 (1976).
3

FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, No. 78-2160 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 26,
1979) (per curiam), at 2.
1493 F. Supp. 286 (D.D.C. 1980).
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2. Do accepted principles of international law condone the mode of subpoena service employed?
The answer to both questions, the court concluded, is no.
At the time the subpoena was served, Judge Wilkey's opinion notes, Congress intended to authorize the FTC to employ only those customary and
legitimate methods of service of compulsory process commonly employed
by United States courts and administrative agencies when serving subpoenas abroad. Because service of compulsory process by registered mail had
not customarily proved to be a legitimate means of summoning a thirdparty witness to appear, with or without documents, in an agency investigation, one had to conclude that this method of service, as employed by the
FTC, was unauthorized and hence invalid.
Judge Wilkey found the district court's opinion unconvincing because of
its failure to draw two distinctions he regarded as being of critical importance in international law: the first, based on the type of document being
served; the second, based on the type of jurisdiction being invoked. "By
failing to draw these crucial distinctions," he said, "the district court failed
to give adequate weight to fundamental principles of international law,
which disfavor methods of extraterritorial subpoena service circumventing
official channels of judicial assistance, oppose judicial enforcement of
investigatory subpoenas abroad,15and prohibit the particular manner of subpoena service employed here."'
B. Nature of the Document Served
As to the FTC's investigation, Judge Wilkey said that Saint-Gobain has
neither the status of an accused in a criminal action nor that of a defendant
in a civil action. It is merely a third-party witness on notice of its potential
status as a party defendant. The FTC's subpoena ought not to be viewed
merely as a summons giving notice of a complaint initiating a lawsuit
against Saint-Gobain. Rather, the issuance of the subpoena and its
enforcement by the district court "represent a classic exercise of compulsory
process, intended to secure the personal appearance of and production of
witness through threat of judicial
documents by an otherwise unwilling
' 6
noncompliance."'
for
sanctions
The opinion went on to note that the distinction between service of notice
and service of compulsory process is a crucial one under principles of both
domestic and international law. When an agency serves a party with notice
of the pendency of an action, it thereby supplies the recipient with informa'1636 F.2d at 1310.
"Id. at 1311. Judge Wilkey analogized respondent's position to that of an American company about to become the target of an investigation by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. At the pre-grand jury subpoena stage, the company and its agents would be
mere third-party witnesses apprised of their status as targets of an investigation. The subpoena
would give them notice of that fact and compel their appearance, but neither the company nor
its agents would have assumed the status of parties until a civil or criminal complaint had been
filed in the proper court.
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tion upon which he may base a decision to act or not. Specifically, when
the FTC issues and serves a formal complaint upon a respondent, charging
him in an adjudicative proceeding with violation of one or more of the
statutes it administers, the purpose of service is primarily notice, rather than
compulsion. Once a respondent is served with a copy of the complaint and
the proposed order, he has the option of meeting with the FTC's counsel to
negotiate a consent order or of proceeding to litigation. If he chooses the
latter, the coercive power of the courts will not be brought to bear upon him
until the cease-and-desist order becomes final.
In contrast, when a witness is served with compulsory process in the form
of an investigatory procedure, regardless of the technique employed, the
consequences of noncompliance are strikingly different: should the witness
fail to produce material responsive to the subpoena, the full enforcement
power of the federal courts may immediately be brought to bear upon him.
Disobedience is itself both a statutory crime and an occasion for imposition
of a money penalty. The FTC could seek a judicial order directing compliance or a finding that respondent is in contempt of court. Summary proceedings may be started, with a finding of contempt the ultimate penalty.
In the event of continued noncompliance, a district court could presumably
enforce its order by seizing the noncomplying respondent's assets wherever
they might' be found and lawfully attached, by holding the officers and
agents of a corporate respondent in contempt, or by otherwise exercising its
discretion to punish a potential witness' recalcitrance. "Unlike service of a
summons and complaint upon a named defendant, delivery of the FTC's
a witness carries with it the full array of
investigatory subpoena upon
17
American judicial power."'
The court added that when the individual being served is not an American on United States soil but a foreign subject on foreign soil, the distinction between the §ervice of notice and the service of compulsory process
takes on added significance. When process in the form of summons and
complaint is served overseas, the informational nature of that process renders the act of service relatively benign. When compulsory process is
served, however, the act of service itself constitutes an exercise of one
sovereign. Such an
nation's sovereignty within the territory of another
18
law.
international
of
violation
a
exercise constitutes
Given its informational nature, Judge Wilkey observed, service of process from the United States into a foreign country by registered mail may
thus be viewed as the least intrusive means of service--e., the device
which minimizes the imposition upon the local authorities caused by official
United States government action within the boundaries of the local state.
Given the compulsory nature of a subpoena, however, subpoena service by
'636 F.2d at 1312.

'The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 at 18; and I L.

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 144b (8th ed. E. Lauterpacht ed. 1955). This citation and those which follow are from
Judge Wilkey's opinion.
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direct mail upon a foreign citizen on foreign soil, without warning to the
officials of the local state and without initial request for or prior resort to
established channels of international judicial assistance, is perhaps maximally intrusive. "Not only does it represent a deliberate bypassing of the
official authorities of the local state, it allows the full range of judicial sanctions for noncompliance with an agency subpoena to be triggered merely by
a foreign citizen's unwillingness to comply with directives contained in an
ordinary registered letter." 19
C. Nature of Jurisdiction Invoked by the
FTC's Service

The exercise of jurisdiction by any governmental body in the United
States is subject to limitations reflecting principles of international and constitutional law, as well as the strictures of the particular statute governing
that body's conduct. When more than one nation is involved, jurisdictional
issues are often elusive. Some jurisdiction which American governmental
bodies might exercise consistently with the United States Constitution and
laws could violate international law, while some exercises of jurisdiction to
which international law does not object may violate the Constitution or
laws of the United States. The jurisdictional questions posed by the instant
case, Judge Wilkey wrote, were peculiarly complex because the jurisdictions of three institutions were at issue: the jurisdiction of the United
States, under international law, to require production of documents by a
foreign citizen on foreign soil; the jurisdiction of American courts to
enforce an administrative agency's subpoena; and the jurisdiction of the
agency itself to effect service of its subpoena by registered mail.
1.

THE INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION OF STATES

A distinction must be drawn between the jurisdiction of a state to prescribe and the jurisdiction of a state to enforce, said Judge Wilkey. 20 The
former signifies a state's authority to enact laws governing the conduct,
relations, status or interests of persons or things, whether by legislation,
executive act or order, or administrative rule or regulation. 2' The latter
describes a state's authority to compel compliance or to impose
sanctions
22
for noncompliance with its administrative or judicial orders.
International law imposes different limitations upon a state's exercise of
its jurisdiction, depending upon whether the jurisdiction exercised is pre"9636 F.2d at 1314. Judge Wilkey noted that a state may give specific or general consent to
direct service of a foreign subpoena, the latter under the Multilateral Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, done
Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S., known informally as "the
Hague Convention."
20

Citing

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES §§ 6-7 (1965) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT).
2

Id., § 6, comment a.

22

1d.
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scriptive or enforcement jurisdiction. Traditionally, a state has plenary
power to prescribe rules within its own territorial boundaries; 23 conversely,
under traditional principles of absolute territoriality "[the laws of a nation]
can have no force to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation
within its own jurisdiction. '24 Over time these rigid principles have yielded
to certain exceptions. Thus, the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Laws ofthe United States recognizes that a state has prescriptive jurisdiction not only over conduct, things, status or interests within its territory,
but also over conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have
substantial effects within its territory, 25 and over conduct of its nationals
even when they are outside its borders. 26 When an American court orders
enforcement of a subpoena requiring the production of documents and
threatens penalties for noncompliance with that subpoena, it invokes the
enforcement jurisdiction, rather than the prescriptive jurisdiction, of the
United States. The two types ofjurisdiction are not geographically coextensive, 27 for, unlike a state's prescriptive jurisdiction, which is not strictly limjurisdiction by and large
ited by territorial boundaries, enforcement
28
continues to be strictly territorial.
If a state should enforce a rule which it does not have jurisdiction to
enforce, the court concluded, it violates international law, thus giving rise to
a claim by the state adversely affected which may then be adjudicated in an
even if the state had
appropriate international forum. 29 This would be true
30
jurisdiction to prescribe the rule in the first place.
"The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116, 136 (1812).
24
The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
"RESTATEMENT, supra note 20 at §§ 17 and 18. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,
148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945); and The S.S. Lotus, supra note 18.
2
6RESTATEMENT, supra note 20 at § 30.
"Id. § 7(1). See generally Mann, Prerogative Rights of Foreign States and the Conflict of
Laws, 40 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 25, 46 (1954).
"RESTATEMENT, supra note 20 at § 20.

-1d. §§ 8, 3(l).
3Judge Wilkey noted that two separate conferences of the International Law Association
had studied the problem and had reached the conclusion he was presenting. At its 51st Conference, held in Tokyo, the ILA had initially concluded:
It is difficult to find any authority under international law for the issuance of orders compelling the production of documents from abroad. The documents are admittedly located in
the territory of another State. To assume jurisdiction over documents located abroad in
advance of a finding of effect upon commerce raises the greatest doubts among non-Americans as to the validity of such orders.
REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 403-7 (Tokyo

1964).
At the ILA's 52nd Conference, in Helsinki, a distinction was made of the sort here
presented:
(1) Where a State requires a local branch [of a foreign company] to produce documents
relating to its own affairs, the demand cannot be resisted merely because the documents are
not within the jurisdiction or that they belong to a nonresident alien. A case may arise when
the discovery is prohibited by his lex situs [the law of the residence of the alien and his
documents]. In such case, each State is acting within its jurisdiction, the one in requiring
production and the other in forbidding it, and a conflict arises.
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In the court's opinion, the district court's enforcement order violated
these principles of international law not because the United States lacks
jurisdiction to prescribe rules relating to the antitrust matters under investigation, but because the district court's order represents an attempt by the
United States to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction within foreign territory before its prescriptive jurisdiction over the investigated conduct has
been proven to exist.

2. TYPES OF AGENCY AND FEDERAL COURT
JURISDICTION DISTINGUISHED

Judge Wilkey's opinion noted that when a state's jurisdiction to adjudicate, as opposed to its enforcement or prescriptive jurisdiction, is at issue,
questions of service of process, subject matter jurisdiction, and personal
jurisdiction are invariably intertwined and hence, frequently confused.
Before a federal court may adjudicate a controversy, it must possess jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the action and the persons whose
rights are to be affected by its determination. Both types of jurisdiction are
constitutionally limited. The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts depends totally upon congressional implementation of a constitutional grant of subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, federal courts are
subject to limits of personal jurisdiction-a court may not exercise its adjudicatory authority over an individual unless it has power to reach him, as
circumscribed by the due process clause of the Constitution. Under modern
doctrine, due process is not satisfied unless the defendant has sufficient
"minimum contacts" with the forum such that the maintenance of a lawsuit
against him in that forum does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."' 3 1 Procedural due process further requires that a
court not exercise its adjudicatory authority over a person, even when it has
the power to do so, unless that person has been given adequate notice and
opportunity to be heard. Thus, a court may lack personal jurisdiction over
an individual either because it is powerless to affect his rights or because it
has failed to give him proper notice that his rights are at issue.
Judge Wilkey wrote:
If properly accomplished, service of process confers personal jurisdiction upon
a court to adjudicate the rights of a party. When as here, the issue is the propriety
of a particular technique of serving a particular type of process, however, neither
(4) Where, however, a State proceeds against a local branch to enforce the production of
documents situate abroad and moreover relating to the affairs or to activities outside the
jurisdiction of the head-office of the nonresident alien, the requirement is only lawful if the
enforcing State has, in fact, substantive jurisdiction to enquire into those affairs and activities. A State abuses its power if it uses the process of its courts to reach further than its
legislative jurisdiction properly extends.
REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 109.112
(Helsinki 1966).
3
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
319 (1945).
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subject matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction-in either the "power" or the
"notice" sense-is directly at issue. The basic inquiry here is thus whether the
district court's enforcement order should be vacated because the manner used by

by, or in some other way
the agency to serve its subpoena was unauthorized
32
obnoxious to, domestic or international law.
The district court in Saint-Gobain, in Judge Wilkey's view, had read
Blackmer v. United States 33 as unequivocally concluding that the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction confers the authority to effect service. It had then
postulated that because the Supreme Court in Blackmer had upheld Congress' power expressly to authorize issuance of subpoenas abroad, it must
also have approved Congress' power to secure service of those subpoenas.
Thus, delegating its subpoena power to the FTC in the FTC Act, Congress
by implication must have delegated to the agency authority to effect subpoena service in any permissible manner.
Judge Wilkey noted, however, that in Blackmer the service of subpoena
had been made in France upon an American who had fled to France. The
34
Supreme Court affirmed the contempt conviction and upheld the statute
involved in Blackmer (against a due process attack) solely on the grounds
that Mr. Blackmer was, and continued to be, a citizen of the United States.
According to Judge Wilkey, the Court had found the statute consistent
with both the Constitution and international law for two reasons. With
respect to the exercise of the United States' prescriptive authority over Mr.
Blackmer, the Court found "there is no question of international law, but
solely of the purport of municipal law which establishes the duties of a
citizen in relation to his own government," namely, the duty "which the
citizen owes to his government. . . to support the administration of justice
by attending its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly
summoned. '35 With respect to the exercise of the United States' adjudicatory authority over Mr. Blackmer, the Court held that the trial court's
authority to give him constitutionally required notice was a necessary
adjunct of its judicial power over him, and was independently based upon
the contact provided by his American citizenship. It specified that Mr.
cases
Blackmer's situation did not present the questions which arise in
36
where obligations inherent in national allegiance are not involved.
Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the primary question in Blackmer
had been one of personal jurisdiction- i.e., whether Mr. Blackmer's citizenship provided a sufficient basis for the court's assertion of adjudicatory
power over him. The only question of international law discussed in that
case was whether Congress had exceeded its prescriptive jurisdiction when
it enacted the statute at issue. The Supreme Court's resolution of that issue
32636 F.2d at 1319.
"3284 U.S. 421 (1932).
34Le., the Walsh Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 711-18 (1926), current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783-84
(1976).
11284 U.S. at 437-38.
36284 U.S. at 438 n.5.
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did not dispose of the question before the court in the present case. The
fact that a state has prescriptive jurisdiction over a certain type of conduct
does not necessarily validate every method by which that state may choose
to serve compulsory process for the purposes of investigating that conduct.
In contrast, in the instant case the primary questions were those of subject matter jurisdiction and service of process. In Blackmer, Congress had
explicitly conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the agency to investigate
conditions which might affect American foreign trade, but it had not explicitly delegated to the agency any authority to serve its subpoena on foreign
citizens abroad. Its intent regarding the proper method of service was
unmistakable. In Saint-Gobain, on the other hand, the precise issue to be
resolved was what technique of service Congress had intended to permit.
Under applicable principles of international law, the relevant issues were
whether the FTC had properly served its subpoena and whether the district
court had exceeded its enforcement jurisdiction by enforcing that subpoena.
However, the respondent company had argued only that the technique of
serving the subpoena which the FTC had used was not lawful outside the
United States, not that the documents located abroad were beyond the
FTC's subpoena authority. The district court expressly assumed that the
FTC's authority to subpoena the documents was not being challenged and
decided that it was proper to infer from the FTC's general regulatory and
investigatory jurisdiction the authority to directly serve compulsorr process
on respondents located abroad.
The court of appeals found that such an inference was unwarranted in
view of the prevailing principles of international law opposing that mode of
service. "Liberal judicial interpretations of agency power are not justified
when agency action threatens to have extraterritorial, rather than merely
national, impact, '' 37 Judge Wilkey wrote, 38 adding:
The reverse side of this general canon of statutory construction, of course, is that
courts of the United States are nevertheless obligated to give effect to an unambiguous exercise by Congress of its jurisdiction to prescribe even if such an exercise would exceed the limitations imposed by international law.3 9 Given the
plain intrusion upon French national sovereignty resulting from the FTC's direct
service of its compulsory process abroad and the violation of international law
which would result if the district court were to enforce the subpoena here, the
only issue is whether the provisions which governed subpoena service within the
FTC Act at the time of the challenged service could
have been sensibly construed
4
so as to avoid conflict with international law. 0

31636 F.2d at 1322.
38
Citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949), and noting that in its original
remand order, FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, No. 78-2160, mem. op.
at 2 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 26, 1979), it had observed that courts are bound, wherever possible, to
construe strictly federal statutes conferring subject matter jurisdiction on domestic agencies to
avoid possible conflicts with contrary principles of international law.
3
RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, at § 38, Reporters' note 1.
°636 F.2d at 1323.
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The court concluded that, in view of the international interests at stake,
the best reading of congressional intent with respect to permissible modes
of subpoena service was one authorizing the FTC to use all customary and
legitimate methods of service of compulsory process commonly employed
by American courts and administrative tribunals. Such a reading would
have imposed the requirement of personal service found in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 45(c), governing permissible methods of subpoena service
by a federal court, upon FTC subpoenas as well.4 1 An agency attempting
subpoena service on a foreign citizen residing on foreign soil also would
have been required, wherever possible, to make initial resort through established diplomatic channels or procedures authorized by international convention, such as the Hague Convention. If, as Professor Covey Oliver had
advised the court in an affidavit, the Hague Convention does not apply to
service by a United States government agency, service could be made by
some other channel mutually acceptable to both governments.
The court cautioned, however, "that, even if expressly authorized by statute, such a mode of service might still be subject to a due process attack if
the witness so served both refused to concede the personal jurisdiction of
the agency and lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the United
States. ' '42 Furthermore, under the principles of international law discussed
above, statutory service like that commonly employed by American courts
and administrative agencies might -still violate international law.
D. Other Noteworthy Observations
Among other noteworthy observations in Judge Wilkey's lengthy opinion
are these:
We cannot imagine that when Congress enacted the FTC Act in 1914 it could
have intended an administrative agency such as the FTC to subpoena witnesses
and documents from abroad by means which no civil litigant had ever been able
to employ within the borders of the United States. Nor can we imagine that
Congress originally intended that the federal courts exercise their enforcement
powers to aid administrative agency investigations by registered mail, without
making provision for the inevitable infringements upon foreign sovereignty
which would result from such exercises. . ..
Such a reading of congressional intent would have seemed flatly inconsistent
with American diplomatic efforts to create regularized inter-governmental channels of international judicial assistance which enable government authorities to
seek evidence abroad with a minimum of infringement on national sover44
eignty. ....
41Subsequent to the service of the subpoena which was here challenged, Congress amended
the FTC Act to give the agency express authority to serve its civil investigatory demands upon
any person who is not found within the territorial jurisdiction of any United States court, in
such manner as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe for service in a foreign nation.
See the new section 20(c)(6)B of the FTC Act added by § 13 of the Federal Trade Commission
Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 381 (enacted May 28, 1980).
42636 F.2d at 1325.
43Id. at 1324.
"Id. at 1324 n.
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We cannot ignore the fact that the scope of administrative agency investigatory
and regulatory jurisdiction has expanded enormously since the FTC Act was
enacted in 1914. Yet it seems reas9nable, when construing a statute potentially in
conflict with international law, to assume that legislation enacted when U.S. government regulation was less pervasive is less likely than more recent legislation to
45
reflect a congressional intent to have effect outside the nation's borders. ....
The zeal with which American litigators have recently engaged in antitrust discovery abroad and the willingness of American courts to order foreign documents
have not only triggered international controversy and academic debate; they have
prompted passage of a fresh wave of foreign nondisclosure laws as well ...
Without granting undue deference to the mandate of foreign nondisclosure laws,
we note simply that where two constructions of a statute are possible, the one less
46
likely to conflict directly with regulations of other nations should be chosen.
E. Separate Opinion by McGowan
Judge McGowan concurred in a separate opinion, saying he did not find
it necessary to explore the jurisdictional distinctions and the intricacies of
international law which loomed so large in the majority opinion. He felt
that the service of an investigative subpoena on a foreign national in a foreign country is a sufficiently significant act as to require that Congress
should speak to it clearly. In the absence of such express congressional
authorization, Judge McGowan was unwilling to infer the requisite authority from the breadth of Congress' power to reach foreign documents in the
exercise of its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, or from a
general delegation by Congress to the FTC of rule-making authority.
II. Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya)

47

Ltd.

Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd is the latest chapter in parallel
London/Dallas litigation which grows out of a contractual relationship
between Nelson Baker Hunt, an American, and a major British oil company (British Petroleum [BP]) with respect to an oil field in Libya. The
field is located in an area where Hunt had been granted a concession in
1957. In 1960 he sold BP an undivided one-half interest in it. A few years
later, both his and BP's interests in the concession were nationalized by the
Libyan government. In the suit discussed here, Hunt asked a federal district court in Dallas to declare that BP is indebted to him under their original 1960 agreement and that he owes BP nothing. BP moved for summary
judgment, asserting that Hunt's requested declaration could not be granted
because of a money judgment entered in its favor and against Hunt in
England by the High Court of Justice.4 8 Hunt replied that the English
judgment was not entitled to recognition.
4

1d. at 1323 n.
Id. at 1325-1327.
4'492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
"The English court had entered judgment against Hunt and had found no basis for a counterclaim by him. BP was awarded about $15 million (U.S.) and £9 million (U.K.). Both parties have appealed.
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The district court held that so long as the English judgment was on
appeal in England it was not entitled to have res judicata effect in proceedings in American courts. But District Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham said
that the United States court could properly stay proceedings before it until
a final termination of the proceedings in Britain.
"In deciding to stay these proceedings," Judge Higginbotham wrote, "we
are perforce deciding that the English judgment has a preclusive effect,
albeit of an unmeasured reach. . . . [S]ociety's interest in preventing relitigation, [in] stability in legal relationships, and [in] an end to litigation can
be furthered without infringing Hunt's right to litigate any matters not pre'49
cluded by the English litigation."
The case for recognition of the British judgment called for an examination of whose law should be applied to determine the recognition issue.
The suit being a diversity action, the federal court, under Erie RailroadCo.
v. Tompkins, 50 had to apply the law of the forum state: Texas. But the fact
that Texas law seemed uncertain as to the recognition of foreign country
judgments gave the court pause, as did "the realization that the recognition
of foreign judgments is an element of United States foreign policy." 5'
Hence, the law of Texas was "not the sole referent." 52 The leading federal
case on point, Hilton v. Guyot, 53 a pre-Erie case, applied principles of comity in order to determine whether a foreign country judgment should be
recognized. But that presented problems, because comity is "not a rule of
law, but one of practice, convenience and expediency" which, "although
does not achieve the
more than mere courtesy and accommodation, ...
54
force of an imperative."
But the foreign court whose rulings were at issue was no ordinary foreign
court, in Judge Higginbotham's view; it was a British court:
Where, as here, the rendering forum's system of jurisprudence has been a
model for other countries in the free world, . . . whose judges are of unquestioned integrity independent of the political winds of the moment, the judgment
rendered55is entitled to a more ministerial, less technocratic, recognition decisional
process.
The basic elements needed to establish a prima facie case under Hilton v.
Guyot-i.e., that the rendering court had personal and subject matter juris"'492 F. Supp. at 891.
30304

U.S. 64 (1938). See also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).

11492 F. Supp. at 892.
521d.

3159 U.S. 113 (1895).
5492 F. Supp. at 894, quotingfrom Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,
453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
"492 F. Supp. at 894, citing Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 161, 166 (1971). In context, Judge Higginbotham's reference to "ministerial" recognition is an analogy to constitutional requirements of full faith and credit in the recognition of
sister state judgments, as opposed to the substantial discretionary, te., "technocratic," element
which considerations of comity ordinarily imply. See his concluding remarks, at 492 F. Supp.
at 905-6.
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diction and that other elements of due process had been met-are the same
for both favored and nonfavored judicial systems, Judge Higginbotham
noted, but these elements "are more likely to be met and it is less likely that
facie cases would be rebutted for judgments from favored syssuch prima
tems." 56
The other elements being clearly present in the British court proceedings,
the only one subject to serious question was that of its personal jurisdiction
over Hunt, a matter as to which the district court, following Cherun v. Frishman,57 felt American due process standards ought to apply. That meant
looking for Hunt's "contacts" with England to determine whether they were
"of such an extent and of such nature that the maintenance of this suit does
not offend fair play and substantial justice." 58 They were.
Hunt argued that the English judgment violated the public policy of
Texas and the United States and so should be denied recognition, even if a
prima facie case for recognition had been established. As summarized by
Judge Higginbotham, Hunt's arguments were: (1) English courts no longer
accept American judgments based upon American statutes; (2) the judgment is based on an English statute which abrogates the common law of
England; (3) the English judgment imposes a statutory penalty in the
absence of any wrongdoing by Hunt; and (4) the English judgment is in
violation of American public policy because it abrogates the fundamental
right to contract.
Judge Higginbotham said these assertions did not support denial of recognition, even assuming arguendo that the first point, i.e., the absence of
reciprocity, was true. Neither reciprocity nor conformity with English common law is a necessary element in recognition of foreign judgments. The
"statutory penalty" complained of was no more or less than a legislative
scheme to allocate losses suffered by parties when a court discharges full
performance of a contract; it could not be considered penal. The fact that
the English judgment permits recovery of prejudgment interest, even if dissimilar to what a Texas court would do, is not of a character which offends
the public policy of the forum. Finally, objecting to the English court's
ruling because it requires Hunt to pay a judgment contrary to a contractual
provision amounts to little more than a quarrel with English law, unless the
judgment is categorized as violative of good morals and natural justice, a
description Judge Higginbotham could not accept.
Hunt also contended that in awarding a money judgment against him the
English court had violated international law, specifically the principle of
the binding effect of contracts, because the 1960 agreement by which Hunt
had sold a one-half interest in the oil concession to BP provided that there
492 F. Supp. at 895.

"236 F. Supp. 292, 296 (D.D.C. 1964).
"8492 F. Supp. at 896, citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1980), which elaborates
upon International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977).
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would be "no personal liability" on Hunt. Judge Higginbotham had some
difficulty accepting the idea that the binding effect of contracts is a fundamental principle of international law:
What international law actually calls for in any particular situation could be a
difficult exercise [to determine], in part because of5 its
9 nature and [because its]
sources are different from the domestic law system.
Even assuming it is, however, and further assuming that the validity of a
contractual provision is not affected by frustration of the contract, the court
felt that Hunt's argument was merely a recasting of his public policy argument. Besides, Judge Higginbotham's opinion says, it is doubtful that
Hunt, as a private individual, would have standing to raise a violation of
customary international law as a cause of action or as a ground for
defense.60

Not having standing to raise international law directly, he cannot have any more
rights to raise it indirectly, as a defense to recognition of a foreign judgment.
Even where the United States enters into a treaty with another nation, and such
treaty by the Constitution becomes the supreme law of the United States, unless
the treaty is self-executing it must
6 1 be implemented by legislation before it gives
rise to a private cause of action.
III. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala

62

Standing to assert international law figured, at least in part, in the resolution of several cases during 1980.63 But perhaps in no other case did a court
disperse as much of the fog which one finds on the subject as the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit was able to disperse in Fiarliga v. PehaIra/a. Simply put, Filartiga was a $10 million wrongful death action
brought by the father and sister of a seventeen-year-old Paraguayan boy
(Joelito Filartiga) who, it is alleged, was tortured to death in Asunci6n, Paraguay, by defendant Americo N. Pefia-Irala in March 1976. At the time,
the defendant was Inspector General of the Police in Asunci6n. Plaintiffs
"492 F. Supp. at 902n.
'°Like the federal district court for the Southern District of Florida in deciding Cohen v.
Hartman, 490 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1980), Judge Higginbotham's statist perception of customary international law owes a great deal to the pre-Filartigadictum in Dreyfus v. von Finck,
534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). The Filarliga decision is
discussed in text accompanying notes 61-85 infra.
'429 F. Supp. at 903, citing Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1298 (3d Cir. 1979). In all candor one feels obliged to observe that, no matter how many
American courts negligently echo this simplistic explanation of the availability of international
legal norms in the interests of individual causes of action or defenses, the explanation cannot
be said to represent cogent thinking, insight or familiarity with either the nature of international law or its contemporary role in American jurisprudence. It is true, in the words of the
Second Circuit in Dreyfus (citing Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 309, 393 (D.D.C. 1958),
that "Il]ike a general treaty, the law of nations has been held not to be self-executing so as to
vest plaintiff with individual rights." What is missing is recognition that such holdings are
often wrong-both as a decription of past trends in authoritative decision and as a prescription
for sensible future ones.
6630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
"See note 6, supra.
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contend that he tortured and killed the boy in retaliation for the boy's
father's outspoken opposition to the regime of Paraguay's President,
64
Alfredo Stroessner.
In 1978, defendant Penia left Paraguay and entered the United States
under a visitor's visa. He remained in this country, overstaying his visa by
some nine months. Dolly Filartiga, who was then living in Washington,
D.C., learned of his presence here and informed the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which thereupon arrested Pefia (and a companion) and
obtained a deportation order against him. At the same time, she caused the
defendant to be served with a summons and civil complaint at the Brooklyn
(New York) Navy Yard, where he was being held pending deportation.
Judge Eugene H. Nickerson of the federal District Court for the Eastern
District of New York stayed the order of deportation, at plaintiffs' request;
but shortly thereafter, following his dismissal of the Filartigas' complaint
on jurisdictional grounds and denials of further stays by the Second Circuit
and the Supreme Court, respectively, the stays expired. Pefla returned to
Paraguay.
The jurisdictional issue was critical in the Second Circuit's subsequent
reversal of Judge Nickerson's decision to dismiss the Filartigas' complaint.
The complaint asserted a cause of action arising under "wrongful death
statutes; the United Nations Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights; the United Nations Declaration Against Torture; the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations, documents and practices constituting the customary international law
of human rights and the law of nations," as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (the
so-called Alien Tort Statute), and Article II, section 2 and the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution. But jurisdiction was claimed
principally under the Alien Tort Statute and the general federal question
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The Alien Tort Statute provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."'65 Plaintiffsappellants did not contend that their action arose directly under a treaty to
which the United States is a party;66 consequently, for the Alien Tort Statute to apply, the conduct alleged by plaintiffs to have occasioned their
loss-torture-had to be found to violate "the law of nations." Judge
Irving R. Kaufman noted 67 that Judge Nickerson had recognized the
"The facts, which are described more fully in Judge Kaufman's opinion, were also discussed
in a previous installment of Trends. See Gordon, Trends: A Review ofSome Recent Cases and
Other Current Developments of Significance to InternationalLawyers, 13 INT'L LAW. 725, 739
(1979).
"'The history of this rarely invoked statute was a subject of comment in the installment of
Trends referred to in note 63, supra, at 741-45.
"That position was taken in briefs amici curiae filed by two groups of private associations
concerned with the protection of human rights. Id. at 741 n.71.
67630 F.2d at 880.
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strength of the Filartigas' argument that official torture violates an emerging norm of customary international law, but nonetheless had felt constrained by dicta contained in two recent Second Circuit opinions to
construe narrowly the phrase "law of nations" as employed in the Alien
Tort Statute; te., so as to exclude norms governing a state's treatment of its
own citizens.
In the earlier of the two cases, lIT v. Vencap, Ltd ,68 the Second Circuit
rejected the argument that the Alien Tort Statute conferred jurisdiction on
the court for action by a foreign investment trust's suit for fraud, conversion
and corporate waste. Writing for the court, Judge Henry Friendly had
noted that the mere fact that every nation's municipal law may prohibit
theft does not incorporate "the Eighth Commandment, 'Thou Shalt not
steal' . . . [into] the law of nations." 69 Vencap adopted a dictum from
Lopes v. Reederei RichardSchroder 70 to the effect that "a violation of the
law of nations arises only when there has been 'a violation by one or more
individuals of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state and (b)
used by those states for their common good and/or dealings inter se.' ",71
Invited by plaintiffs to find that the condemnation of torture meets Vencap's statist test (in that it is designed to serve the common good of all
nations and in that the practice of torture necessarily affects relations
between states), Judge Kaufman in Filartiga instead said of Vencap's test:
"We have no quarrel with this formulation so long as it be understood that
the courts are not to prejudge the scope of the issues that the nations of the
world may deem important to their interrelationships, and thus to their
common good."' 72 He then quoted with approval the following comment
from a lecture delivered at The Hague Academy several decades ago by the
late Professor Lawrence Preuss of the University of Michigan. Preuss had
said:
[Tihe sphere of domestic jurisdiction is not an irreducible sphere of rights which
are somehow inherent, natural or fundamental. It does not create an impenetrable barrier to the development of international law. Matters of domestic jurisdiction are not those which are left by international law for regulation by States.
There are, therefore, no matters which are domestic by their "nature." All are
susceptible of international legal regulation and73may become the subjects of new
rules of customary law or of treaty obligations.
"Here," Judge Kaufman concluded, "the nations of the world have made it
their business, both through international accords and unilateral action, to
--519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
11Id. at 1015.
7O225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
7519 F.2d at 1015, quoting Lopes, supra, 225 F. Supp. at 297.
12630 F.2d at 888.
7"Preuss,Article 2, Paragraph7 ofthe Charterof the UnitedNations andMatters of Domestic
Jurisdiction, Hague Receuil (Extract, 1949), at 20, as reprinted in H. BRIGGs, THE LAW OF
NATIONs 24 (1952).
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be concerned with domestic human rights violations of [the] magnitude
[here involved].

' 74

The other Second Circuit case whose dictum had led to a narrow construction of the term "law of nations" is Dreyfus v. von Finck.75 In Dreyfus,
which concerned a forced sale of property, the court had repeated its Vencap dictum, saying that "violations of international law do not occur when
the aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state."'76 That dictum,
Judge Kaufman wrote,
is clearly out of tune with the current usage and practice of international law.
The treaties and accords [herein] cited, as well as the express foreign policy of our
own government, all make it clear that international law confers fundamental
rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments. While the ultimate scope
of those rights will be a subject for continuing refinement and77elaboration, we
hold that the right to be free from torture is now among them.
Defendant-appellee Pefia submitted that even if torture is a violation of
modern international law,78 federal jurisdiction may not be exercised consistent with the dictates of Article III of the Constitution. He contended
that, to the extent that the Alien Tort Statute's reference to a tort committed
in violation of international law is read to refer to an act involving an
ambassador or consul or one of the other specific categories of cases and
controversies as to which the federal judicial power is extended by Article
III, section 2, of the Constitution, the statute's constitutionality is clear. But
there is, he argued, no constitutional basis for a reading of the statute (or of
11630 F.2d at 889.
'1534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).

F.2d at 31.
F.2d at 884-5. In disposing of the dictum in Dreyfus, Judge Kaufman may have inadvertently produced dictum of his own which he or some other court will have to narrow, distinguish or reject. In what way, for example, does "the express foreign policy of our own
government" have a bearing on the rights which international law confers? And what will
future courts say about how customary international law is formed in light of this summary of
the holding in Filartiga by Judge Kaufman:
In light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous international agreements, and
the renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually all of the nations
of the world (inprinciple f not inpractice),we find that an act of torture committed by a state
official against one held in detention violates established norms of the international law of
human rights, and hence the law of nations.
630 F.2d at 880. (emphasis added). Is an American court now on record as saying, or implying, that customary international law may be established on the basis of what nations say,
without any showing of a corresponding conformity in actual state practice? In this respect,
Judge Kaufman observed: "The fact that the prohibition of torture is often honored in the
breach does not diminish its binding effect as a norm of international law." 630 F.2d at 884 n.,
citing J. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (1944). That is true, but it
proceeds from the premise that the norm in question has been accepted as a legal obligation to
start with. If the contested point is whether the norm in fact has been so accepted, then the
actual conformity of state practice with mere pronouncements on the subject is indeed a relevant consideration. See, e.g., the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Asylum
case [1950] I.C.J.Rep. at pp. 276-77; and, more generally, I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7 (2d ed. 1973).
78
The parties had agreed that the acts alleged would violate Paraguayan law, as well as
American law. Id. at 885.
16534

7630
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section 1331, for that matter) which would encompass rules of international
law, unless it is the "federal question" language in Article III, section 2, i e.,
that which extends the judicial power to "all Cases in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and treaties."
But such a basis could not be justified.
The court found this claim to be without merit. It noted, first, that common law courts of general jurisdiction regularly adjudicate transitory tort
claims between individuals over whom they exercise personal jurisdiction,
wherever the tort occurred. 79 Moreover, it said, international law "has
80
always been part of the federal common law."
That it has always been part of the federal common law seems evident
from the historical survey which the late Professor Edwin Dickinson provided in an article on this subject nearly three decades ago, 8' an article
which Judge Kaufman enthusiastically cited in his opinion. Nevertheless,
some of the recent decisions cited at the outset of this installment of Trends
are open to the suspicion that the certainty of international law's place in
the federal law is not readily apparent to all judges.
Defendant-appellee Pefia contended that customary international law, as
reflected in treaties and declarations that are not self-executing, should not
be applied as rules of decision in this case. In fact, however, customary
international law was relevant only as a basis for finding subject matter
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute. The issue of the choice of law to
be applied was not before the court of appeals, which was concerned only
82
with Judge Nickerson's finding that no subject matter jurisdiction existed.
Pefla also argued that, if the conduct complained of is alleged to be the
act of the Paraguayan government, then the suit is barred by the act of state
doctrine. He had not raised the issue at the district court level, however,
and the circuit court said the issue therefore was not before it on appeal.
"We note in passing, however," Judge Kaufman wrote, "that we doubt
whether action by a state official in violation of the Constitution and laws of
the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation's govern'1Id. at 885.
8
The power of the federal courts to recognize common law claims has inspired passionate
scholarly debate. See, e.g., Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth ofErie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974);
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383
(1964); and Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the JudicialProcess, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1957). "Yet, in spite of the stridency of this debate," Judge A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., of the Third Circuit observed in an otherwise unrelated recent decision, "two principles
firmly and resolutely emerge. First, there is a federal common law. Second, in some circumstances federal common law causes of action arise from the interstices of congressional acts."
Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
" Dickinson, The Law ofNations as Part of the NationalLaw of the UnitedStates, 101 U. PA.
L. REV. 26 (1952).
2
If the district court applied Paraguayan law, Judge Kaufman said, such a decision would

not retroactively oust the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction, even though plaintiffs'
cause of action would no longer properly be "created" by a law of the United States. 630 F.2d
889 n., citing American Well Works Co. v. Lane & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
(Holmes, J.).
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ment, could properly be characterized as an act of state. Paraguay's renunciation of torture as a legitimate instrument of state policy, however, does
not strip the tort of its character as an international83law violation, if in fact
it occurred under color of government authority.
In closing, Judge Kaufman observed that the foreign relations implications of the issues which the district court would be required to adjudicate
on remand underscored the wisdom of the First Congress, which, through
its passage of the Alien Tort Statute, vested jurisdiction over such claims in
the federal district courts. "Questions of this nature," he said, "are fraught
with implications for the nation as a whole, and therefore should not be left
84
to the potentially varying adjudications of the courts of the fifty states."
IV. Concluding Thoughts
Judge Kaufman's opinions these days show an uncommon regard for historical context. 8 5 Nowhere is the regard more in evidence than in the concluding paragraph of his Filartiga opinion, where he wrote:
In the twentieth century the international community has come to recognize
the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic human rights and
particularly the right to be free of torture. Spurred first by the Great War, and
then the Second, civilized nations have banded together to prescribe acceptable
norms of international behavior. From the ashes of the Second World War arose
the United Nations Organization, amid hopes that an era of peace and cooperation had at last begun. Though many of these aspirations have remained elusive
goals, that circumstance cannot diminish the true progress that has been made.
In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to
lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human
rights is in their individual and collective interest. Among the rights universally
proclaimed by all nations, as we have noted, is the right to be free of physical
torture. Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the
pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humanigeneris, an enemy of all mankind. Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our
First Congress, is a small but important step86in the fulfillment of the ageless
dream to free all people from brutal violence.
If American courts had said no more than this about international law
during 1980, it still would have sufficed to illustrate the trend in contemporary international law away from rote application of inherited rules toward
the conscious promotion of norms, procedures and institutions which serve
to promote humane world order values.

S630 F.2d at 890. (citations omitted).
4Id.

"See, e.g., Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980).
"630 F.2d at 890.

